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Until the case of Fish v. Liley," it was generally believed that
a cause of action for wrongful death to a. husband did not survive
the death of a tort-feasor, inasmuch as the survival statute barred
all actions for injuries to the person upon the death of the tort-
feasor. In Fish v. Liley, recovery was allowed against the deceased
tort-feasor's estate on the grounds that the right to recover against
the deceased tort-feasor was a property right which survived and
was therefore not an action for trespass for injuries to the person.
It is to be presumed that this doctrine may be extended to include
all persons who were entitled to recover under the Wrongful Death
Statute, including parents, children, and a suit by the husband
against the deceased tort-feasor for the death of his wife.
Perhaps the Fish v. Liley case has further extensions. The
reasoning in the case might open a new avenue for a wife to seek
recovery for injuries which do not result in death. Strictly con-
strued, this case recognizes that a wife has a property right in
the continued life of her husband, the amount of which is meas-
ured by her pecuniary loss upon his death. It does 'not take a great
deal of imagination on the basis of this case to see the possibility
that the court might find that the wife has a property right in the
continued physical well-being of her husband and in his continued
availability as a handyman, chauffeur, mechanic and father. Such
loss can be measured with some degree of certainty in much the
same way as the courts measure a husband's right to recover for
the loss of his wife's services as housekeeper, nurse and mother.
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DAMAGES-RECOVERY OF EXPENSES OF LITIGATION IN A SUB-
SEQUENT ACTION-Landis was sued in a tort action by McGowan.
Pikes Peak Company was joined as a defendant, and cross claimed
against Landis as an indemnitor and for costs of defending against
McGowan's action. Costs were awarded the Pikes Peak Company,
as well as to McGowan, who was successful in that litigation. An
appeal was taken by Landis, and Pikes Peak Company only par-
ticipated to defend the costs awarded by the lower court.' Landis
paid the judgments. Sun Indemnity Co., as subrogee of Pikes
Peak Co. now sues Landis for expense of taking depositions for
use in the prior trial, and attorney fees and disbursements, includ-
ing $250 for services of attorneys in connection with the appellate
proceedings wherein Pikes Peak Co. obtained affirmance of its
judgment against Landis.
"120 Colo. 156, 208 P. 2d 930 (1949).
'Landis v. McGowan, 114 Colo. 355, 165 P. 2d 180 (1946).
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Held: The indemnitee is not entitled to attorney's fees in-
curred in connection with trial of the issue of indemnity. Attor-
ney's fees and costs of litigation are recoverable only as part of
the damages resulting from defendant's wrongful act, and plain-
tiff cannot split his cause of action to recover on part of his costs
in one suit and part of his costs in a subsequent action. Nor can
plaintiff allocate his costs between defending against the claim
filed by McGowan and in asserting his right to indemnity from
Landis. Having asserted a claim for costs in his cross claim,
plaintiff should have made proof of all of his costs in that action,
if he were entitled to them. Having failed to do so, the matter
is now res judicata.-Sun Indemnity Co. v. Landis, 119 Colo. 191,
201 P. 2d 602 (1948).
As a general rule the costs and expenses of litigation, other
than the usual court costs, are not recoverable in an action for
damages nor in a subsequent action for costs incurred in the
previous litigation.2 Early Colorado cases refused attorney fees
as damages, holding that such fees were not to be allowed as dam-
ages in the absence of a statute or contract to that effect,3 and
that the allowance of attorney's fees is not discretionary with the
court.
4
Certain exceptions to this rule have grown up. In suits in
which a fund or estate has been impounded reasonable expenses
including counsel fees incurred by one seeking to collect, or pre-
serve, the fund or estate, will be allowed.5 It will be noted these
actions are usually equitable in nature. In equity suits where no
fund has been impounded, it has been generally assumed that re-
covery of expenses should be limited to taxable costs. 6 Where the
adverse claim or defense was unconscionable, fees of counsel have
been allowed as costs, 7 and it is frequently said that assessment
of costs is within the sound discretion of the court. This state-
ment is usually found in cases of an equitable nature.8
It is well settled, and usually provided by statute, that a wife
suing or defending in an action for divorce or separation is en-
titled to an order requiring the husband to pay her reasonable
counsel fees. Statutes also provide for attorney's fees and other
expenses as items of costs, especially in suits to collect wages,
certain actions against railroad companies and other corpora-
tions, etc.
When the natural and probable consequence of a wrongful act
involves a plaintiff in litigation with others, Colorado has gen-
2 Winkler v. Roeder, 23 Neb. 706, 37 N. W. 607 (1888) ; Pacific Postal Tel. Cable
Co. v. Bank of Palo Alto, 109 F. 369 (1901).
sSpencer v. Murphy, 6 Colo. App. 453, 41 P. 84. (1895).
4 Joslin v. Teats, 5 Colo. App. 531, 39 P. 349 (1895).
6MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES 237 (1935).
Patterson v. Northern Trust Co., 286 Il1. 564, 122 N. E. 55 (1919).
'Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 28 F. 2d 233 (1928) ; Geijs-
beek v. Martin, 27 Colo App. 316, 148 P. 921 (1915).
5Willoughby v. Willoughby, 71 Colo. 356, 206 P. 792 (1922); Union Exploration
Co. v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist. 104 Colo. 109, 89 P. 2d 257 (1939).
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erally held reasonable expenses of the litigation may be recovered
from the wrongdoer. 9 This holding is in line with the general
rule.10 Most courts have held the costs of litigation must be recov-
ered in a subsequent suit, but there seems no reason for this rule,
and one case 11 held attorney fees could be recovered in the same
action between the parties, saying:
The case rests not on the fact that the services of counsel were
rendered in a different action than the one in which recovery was
allowed, but upon the fact that the wrong of defendants was of such
a character that it necessitated the employment of counsel to give
the plaintiff redress.
It would seem from the instant case that Colorado would follow
this view, although it would probably be limited strictly to cases
where the claim of a third party was involved unless the action
were vexatiously commenced, in which case attorney fees may
be allowed.
12
To give an indemnitee or a joint tort feasor the right to
claim his costs in defending a suit, where he is entitled to in-
demnity, he must first notify his indemnitor, or joint tort feasor
of the pendency of the suit and call upon him to defend it."3 How-
ever, where the indemnitee failed to request the indemnitor to
defend the action against him, and defended with full knowledge
and consent of the indemnitor, it has been held he can recover
attorney fees and other expenses incurred in the suit. 14
The instant case correctly holds, under the orthodox view,
that attorney fees and other costs of litigation cannot be recovered
where the action is to litigate the question of indemnity. But it
would not seem that the problem of allocation of costs between
the defense against liability to a third party, and asserting the
claim for indemnity should have caused the court any difficulty.
That a loss cannot be exactly determined will not defeat a claim
or allow the wrongdoer to escape at the expense of his victim. 1
Whenever the wrongful act of one person results in liability being
imposed on another, the latter may have indemnity from the per-
son actually guilty of the wrong, and this should include his costs
in defending against the suit in which the liability became fixed.1 6
In actions not involving a third person, generally costs are
not allowed to defendant beyond the statutory court costs, on the
theory that to do so would discourage litigation of rightful claims,
and defendant's injury is damnum absque injuria.17 In allowing
'International Bank of Trinidad v. Trinidad Bean and Elevator Co., 79 Colo. 286,
245 P. 489 (1926).
"MCCORMICK ON DAMAGEs 247 (1935).
"Malloy v. Carroll, 287 Mass. 170, 191 N. E. 661 (1934).
2 Colo. Rules Civ. Proc., 3(a).
"Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. Northeastern Tel. Exchange Co., 140 Minn.
229, 167 N. W. 800 (1918) ; Ireland v. Linn Co. Bank, 103 Kan. 618, 176 P. 103 (1918).
14 Miller v. New York Oil Co., 34 Wyo. 272, 243 P. 118 (1926).
15Goldstein v. Rocky Mountain Envelope Co., 78 Colo. 341, 241 P. 1110 (1925).
"Miller v. New York Oil Co., supra.
"0. S. Stapley Co. v. Rogers, 25 Ariz. 308, 216 P. 1072 (1923).
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expenses as an element of damages, the trend seem to be toward
a more liberal view in equitable actions. In Morris v. Redak,1 8 the
Colorado Supreme Court again supported this view. In denying
plaintiff his costs in securing depositions, the court said:
We consider that taking depositions of witnesses in preparation
for trial is something in the nature of a luxury, and that one who
avails himself of this procedure does so at his own expense. . . . If the
testimony of the person whose deposition is taken is not available
at the trial, and the deposition is offered in lieu thereof, then the
court would have discretion in determining whether the expense of




DAMAGES-MAY NOMINAL DAMAGES BE RECOVERED WITHOUT
SHOWING ACTUAL DAMAGES?-The parties entered into a written
agreement whereby plaintiff purchased from defendant his interest
in their partnership business, the contract providing that defend-
ant would not reenter business in competition with plaintiff. De-
fendant, in violation of the agreement, entered business for which
plaintiff brought an action seeking an injunction and damages for
breach of contract. The trial court denied the application for a
temporary injunction because, "There had been no showing of
real or actual injury." The supreme court reversed and remanded
the case with instructions to issue the injunction to be effective
pending determination of the case on its merits.-Ditus v. Beahm,
- Colo. -, 232 P. 2d 184 (1951).
In so holding, the court stated the rule as being well settled
that:
Where an established business has been sold and there is a valid
covenant not to compete, a breach is regarded as the controlling
factor and injunctive relief follows almost as a matter of course.
In such cases the damage is presumed to be irreparable and the
remedy at law is considered inadequate. It is not necessary to first
prove special pecuniary damages or show an actual loss of customers.
Injunctive relief may be given, even though nominal damages are
shown, or although no actual damage is shown.
Although the decision does not specifically deal with the prob-
lem of awarding damages, the court limiting its disposition of the
case to the question of the injunction, the language of the court
suggests that the breach of the contract will warrant a judgment
for nominal damages even though actual damages may not be
shown. In granting the injunction, the court particularly stated
that in such case the damage is presumed to be irreparable. Such
damages, it would seem, would require an award for nominal dam-
ages even in the absence of actual damage.
Under the prevailing authority, nominal damages are awarded
as a recognition of some breach of duty owed by defendant to
I 1950-51 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. 345 (No. 20, June 30).
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plaintiff and not as compensation for loss or detriment sustained.
In effect the court will allow an adverse relief against the party
owing the duty, if he violates it, though he has caused no loss.'
In breach of contract cases, the rule seems to be settled that
the mere breach by defendant, though unaccompanied by injury
to plaintiff, gives rise to a cause of action for nominal damages.2
On the other hand many courts require a showing of actual dam-
ages in cases of fraud and deceit; therefore, without proof of
actual damages the case will fail and nominal damages will not
be allowed. 3 Thus in an aftion to recover damages for false repre-
sentation, the trial court was reversed for failure to direct a ver-
dict in favor of defendant because of plaintiff's failure to make
out a case of actionable false representation when he had based
his test of an alleged year's value of a business on only one month's
trial. 4 In so deciding, the court held that:
Even if a representatition be fraudulent and of past or existing
fact, and the party to whom it is addressed acts upon it, an action
of deceit will not lie unless damage has resulted.
The general rule seems to be that in the absence of actual
detriment, the plaintiff in an action for trespass to person or
property may nevertheless recover nominal damages, and the rule
is likewise in actions for deliberate and willful trespass. 5 How-
ever, it has been recently held by the Colorado Supreme Court that
in an action for assault and battery, the record being devoid of
any evidence of damage sustained by the plaintiff, a directed ver-
dict and judgment for defendant was proper.,
Thus, Ditus v. Beahm does not specifically consider whether a
showing of actual damages must be made to warrant a judgment
for at least nominal damages. It does suggest, however, that since
the mere breach of contract against competing gives rise to a
presumption of irreparable damage so as to warrant a temporary
injunction, such a breach would in addition give rise to actual
damages if so shown. It would at least warrant nominal damages




'MCCORM'CK ON DAMAGES 85 (1935).
2 Cooper v. Clute, 174 N.C. 366, 93 S. E. 915 (1917) Kiblinger v. Sank Bank, 131
Wlsc. 595, 111 N. W. 709 (1907).2
Alden v. Wright, 47 Minn. 225, 49 N.W. 767 (1891) Bailey v. Oatis, 85 Kan. 339,
116 P. 830 (1911).
4 Sposata v. Heggs ....... Colo ........ 1950-51 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. 328 (No. 18, May 26).
6Parker v. Kirkpatrick, 124 Me. 181, 126 A. 824 (1924) ; Lee v. Lee, 180 N.C. 86,
104 S E. 76 (1920).
6Davis v. Heinze, 117 Colo. 155, 184 P. 2d 493 (1947).
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